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olistic bank. We demonstrate that this model’s results on the comparative
static effects of a change in the exogenous interbank market interest rate do
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1. Introduction
This paper investigates extensions of the well-known Klein-Monti model of a repre-
sentative, profit-maximizing bank, originally introduced by Klein (1971) and Monti
(1972). The Klein-Monti model is a prototype model of the so-called Industrial Or-
ganization approach to banking, in which banks are considered as profit-maximizing
firms that offer services to agents; see e.g. the recent book by Freixas and Rochet
(1997). These services are described by the securities that banks buy from agents
(i.e. loans) and sell to agents (i.e. deposits). The difference between the volume of
deposits and the volume of loans is the bank’s (net) position on the interbank market.
The Klein-Monti model is described and compared to alternative models of banking
in surveys by Baltensperger (1980) and Santomero (1984). It has been generalized
and extended by many authors, for example by Dermine (1986) and Prisman et al.
(1986). Hannan (1991) shows that the model can be used to derive various empirical
predictions. For that reason, it has been the (implicit) starting point for a number of
empirical studies, for instance in Molyneux et al. (1994), Neuberger and Zimmerman
(1990), and Suominen (1994). The model is also discussed in detail by Freixas and
Rochet (1997).
Although the original Klein-Monti model concentrates on the case of a single, mo-
nopolistic bank, which might apply in countries with only one (state) bank, the situ-
ation of several banks is more interesting. In fact, as Molyneux et al. (1994) observe
for the case of Europe, in many countries the banking industry is very concentrated,
which suggests that oligopoly models are relevant for banking. In order to extend
the Klein-Monti model to the case of more than one bank, the standard oligopoly
models from the theory of Industrial Organization (Martin, 1993) can be used as a
starting point. In particular, the extension towards a symmetric Cournot oligopoly,
in which all banks are assumed to have the same linear management-cost function,
is straightforward, as shown by Freixas and Rochet (1997). These authors examine
some comparative static properties of both the original model and the symmetric
Cournot version with respect to changes in the exogenous interbank market interest
rate. Such changes can be made by the central bank in order to influence the volumes
of loans and deposits of banks and the corresponding interest rates. We extend their
analysis to other forms of market structure.
Intuitively, one would expect an increase in the interbank market rate to lead to a
decrease in a bank’s volume of loans, an increase in its volume of deposits, and in-
creases in the interest rates on loans and deposits. This is exactly what occurs both in
the original, monopolistic Klein-Monti model and in the symmetric Cournot version
of Freixas and Rochet (1997). In this paper we demonstrate that this result does not
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necessarily hold in asymmetric oligopolistic generalizations of the model. In order
to show this we introduce asymmetries either in the management-cost functions of
the banks or in their way of conduct. For simplicity, we concentrate on the situa-
tion with two banks. In particular, we investigate the Cournot case with asymmetric
management-cost functions and, as an example of asymmetric conduct, the Stackel-
berg case. It turns out that in both cases we can obtain counterintuitive comparative
static effects of a change in the interbank market interest rate on individual banks’
volumes of loans (deposits).
The observation that comparative static effects in oligopolistic markets might be
counterintuitive is also made in some related studies. In particular, Dixit (1986) in-
vestigates a general quantity-setting conjectural variations oligopoly. The conjectural
variations, as well as the cost functions, may be different for different firms. The
Cournot case and the Stackelberg case can be obtained as special cases by choos-
ing the conjectural variations in an appropriate way. However, Dixit focuses mainly
on the general methodology of comparative statics and on the effects of parameter
changes on the profits of the firms, whereas we focus on the output (loan and de-
posit volumes) and price (interest rate) effects as these are more relevant in our con-
text. Moreover, Dixit only mentions the Stackelberg case in passing, without further
analysing it. Katz and Rosen (1985) consider a similar kind of oligopoly in which
the conjectural variations as well as the cost functions are identical for all firms. As a
result, our analysis does not fit within their framework. Kimmel (1992) investigates
the effects of common cost changes in a Cournot oligopoly. However, Kimmel fo-
cuses the attention on the effects of these changes on the profits and market shares
of the firms, i.e. not on the absolute size of the output of each firm as we do. Fi-
nally, Caputo (1996) discusses comparative static properties of Nash equilibria by
using a so-called dual methodology which is based on the Envelope Theorem. Using
the same methodology, Caputo (1998) analyses comparative statics of a Stackelberg
equilibrium. However, these papers focus mainly on the general methodology, and
our results do not readily follow from them.
The next section introduces the original Klein-Monti model of a monopolistic bank,
and summarizes its comparative static properties. This model will be considered as
our benchmark case. Section 3 presents the generalized version of the model and
its comparative static properties in the situation where the two banks are Cournot
oligopolists with asymmetric management-cost functions. Section 4 examines the
Stackelberg case, in which conduct is asymmetric. Section 5 concludes.
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2. The Klein-Monti Model
Assume that there is a single, monopolistic bank, that chooses its outputs in order
to maximize profits. The bank operates on the market for loans as well as on the
market for deposits. The difference between the volume of loans L and the volume
of deposits D of the bank can be borrowed (or lent, if negative) on an interbank
market. Denote the interest rates on the loan market and deposit market by rL and rD,
respectively. The inverse demand function for loans is given by rL.L/, with derivative
r 0L.L/ < 0, and the inverse supply function of deposits is rD.D/, with derivative
r 0D.D/ > 0. The cost of managing an amount L of loans and an amount D of deposits
is given by the convex management-cost function C.L;D/. The functions rL./, rD./
and C.L;D/ are continuously differentiable up to any order.
Let r denote the exogenous interest rate on the interbank market, and  be the exoge-
nous fraction of deposits that is required as a non-interest bearing reserve (0   <
1). Both r and  are set by the central bank.
The bank’s decision problem is to maximize its profits .L;D/, i.e.
max
.L;D/
.L;D/ D [rL.L/ − r]L C [r.1 − / − rD.D/]D − C.L;D/
We assume that .L;D/ is strictly concave. The first-order conditions are
@
@L
D r 0L.L/L C rL.L/ − r −
@
@L
C.L;D/ D 0 (1)
@
@D
D r.1 − / − r 0D.D/D − rD.D/ −
@
@D
C.L;D/ D 0 (2)
From (1) and (2), the unique (positive) solution .bL; bD/ can be derived. The corre-
sponding interest rates are given bybrL andbrD. If the cost function is separable, i.e.
C.L;D/ D CL.L/ C CD.D/, the maximization problem is separable. That is, the
optimal volume of loans bL (and the corresponding interest ratebrL) is independent of
the properties of the deposit market, and the optimal volume of deposits bD (and the
corresponding interest ratebrD) is independent of the properties of the loan market.
Freixas and Rochet (1997, p. 59) discuss the comparative static effects of a change of
the interbank interest rate r in the Klein-Monti model, assuming separability. They
show that dbL=dr < 0, dbD=dr > 0, dbrL=dr > 0, and dbrD=dr > 0, which we will
refer to as the benchmark case.
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3. Asymmetric Management Costs
Next, we consider the case in which there is Cournot competition with two banks on
both markets. Let the index i denote bank i, i D 1; 2. Define total loan and deposit
volumes by L  L1 C L2 and D  D1 C D2. Bank i maximizes its profit function




i.Li;Di/ D [rL.Li C Lj/ − r]Li
C[r.1 − / − rD.Di C Dj/]Di − Ci.Li;Di/
where i; j D 1; 2, i 6D j . Assume that the cost function Ci.Li;Di/ is linear,
Ci.Li;Di/ D γL;iLi C γD;iDi (3)
in order to keep the analysis manageable. Note that the cost function (3) is not neces-
sarily equal for the two banks, i.e. we allow for asymmetric costs.
We assume that a unique (positive) Nash-Cournot equilibrium, .Li ; Di /, i D 1; 2,
exists, with corresponding interest rates rL and rD. It is given by the simultaneous
solution of the first-order conditions
@i
@Li
D r 0L.Li C Lj/Li C rL.Li C Lj/ − r − γL;i D 0 (4)
@i
@Di
D r.1 − / − r 0D.Di C Dj/Di − rD.Di C Dj/ − γD;i D 0 (5)
with i; j D 1; 2, i 6D j . In case the two banks have the same cost function, the solution
is symmetric, i.e. L1 D L2 and D1 D D2 . On the other hand, in the asymmetric costs
case we have Li > Lj if and only if γL;i < γL;j , and Di > Dj if and only if
γD;i < γD;j .
Proceeding, we observe that (4) and (5) implicitly define the reaction functions L1 D
f1.L2/, L2 D f2.L1/, D1 D g1.D2/ and D2 D g2.D1/. Let us consider the derivatives
of the reaction functions, and concentrate on bank 2. For the loan side we obtain:
f 02.L1/ D −
r 0L./ C r 00L./f2.L1/
2r 0L./ C r 00L./f2.L1/
(6)
where the first-order and second-order derivatives of rL./ are evaluated in the point
.L1 C f2.L1//. The denominator is identical to the second-order derivative of bank
2’s (strictly concave) profit function with respect to L2 and therefore is negative. This
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shows that f 02.L1/ > −1. We assume that r 00L./ < −r 0L./=f2.L1/, i.e. the inverse
demand function for loans is not too convex. Consequently,
−1 < f 02.L1/ < 0 (7)
Similarly, for the deposit side we assume r 00D./ > −r 0D./=g2.D1/ i.e. the inverse
supply function of deposits is not too concave, which implies that
−1 < g02.D1/ < 0 (8)
For bank 1, a similar result holds. Decreasing reaction functions can be considered as
the normal case with quantity strategies (Shapiro, 1989). Note that with linear inverse
loan demand, we have f 0i .Lj / D − 12 , and with linear inverse deposit supply, we have
g0i .Dj / D − 12 , i; j D 1; 2, i 6D j .
Now let us turn to the comparative static effects of a change in the interbank in-
terest rate r in this Cournot version of the Klein-Monti model. This question is
also considered by Freixas and Rochet (1997, p. 60), who assume symmetric, linear
management-cost functions. Also, for simplicity, they assume constant elasticities of
demand of loans and supply of deposits. We do not use the latter assumption. We
remark that we will only discuss the details here for the loan side. Details for the
deposit side are similar.
By totally differentiating (4) with respect to r for i D 1; 2, and next solving the






/ C r 00L.L/[Lj − Li ]
r 0L.L/[3r 0L.L/ C r 00L.L/L]












3r 0L.L/ C r 00L.L/L
(11)
where L  L1 C L2. A similar result can be obtained for deposits. Next, let L.Li/
be the elasticity of r 0L.Li C Lj/ with respect to Li , i.e. L.Li/ D r 00L.L/Li=r 0L.L/.
Similarly, D.Di/ is the elasticity of r 0D.Di C Dj/ with respect to Di . Using this, we
can present Proposition 3.1.
Proposition 3.1 In the Cournot version of the model the following holds:
(a) dL
dr






(b) Let r 00L.L/  0 and/or the marginal management costs of loans be identical




< 0, i D 1; 2.
(c) Let r 00L.L/ < 0 and the marginal management costs of loans be different for
both banks, with γL;1 < γL;2 say. Then
dL2
dr




7 0 if and
only if 1 C L.L2/ ? L.L1/.
(d) dD
dr





(e) Let r 00D.D/  0 and/or the marginal management costs of deposits be identi-




> 0, i D 1; 2.
(f) Let r 00D.D/ > 0 and the marginal management costs of deposits be different









and only if 1 C D.D2/ ? D.D1/.
PROOF. Recall that the profit function i./ is strictly concave, and notice that
r 0L.L
/ C r 00L.L/Lj < 0, as the reaction function fj .Li/ is downward sloping, i; j D
1; 2; j 6D i. Using this, part (a) easily follows from (10) and (11). Next, we see that
dLi =dr  0 if and only if the numerator of (9) is nonnegative. In turn, since r 0L.L/C
r 00L.L/L

j < 0, the latter condition implies that −r 00L.L/Li > 0, which cannot hold
if r 00L.L/  0. This proves part (b). Part (c) follows from (9), the fact that L1 > L2 if
and only if γL;1 < γL;2, and the observation that r 0L.L/Cr 00L.L/[L2 −L1] ? 0 if and
only if 1 C L.L2/ 7 L.L1/. The parts (d), (e) and (f) can be proven similarly.
We remark first that parts (a) and (d) of Propostion 3.1 also follow easily from Kim-
mel (1992, Proposition 1). Second, from parts (a) and (b) of Proposition 3.1 we con-
clude that in the symmetric case with identical management-cost functions, the com-
parative static effects of a change in r on L1, L2 and L all have the ‘normal’ negative
sign, directly comparable to the result of the original Klein-Monti model. Moreover,
it appears that this also holds for asymmetric cost functions as long as the inverse
loan demand function is convex in the Nash-Cournot equilibrium (note that a linear
inverse loan demand function satisfies this requirement).
On the contrary, part (c) learns that if the marginal costs of the banks are different, and
moreover the inverse loan demand is strictly concave in the Nash-Cournot equilib-
rium, then the sign of the effect of a change in r on the loan volume of the bank with
the smallest marginal loan costs depends on the relative sizes of L.L1/ and L.L2/.
In particular, if bank 1 has the smallest marginal loan costs, then the loan volume of
bank 1 changes in the same direction as the interbank market rate, i.e. dL1=dr > 0,
if and only if 1 C L.L2/ < L.L1/, i.e. if the elasticity L.L1/ is ‘large’ as compared
to the elasticity L.L2/. This stands in contrast to the intuitive, benchmark result of
the monopolistic Klein-Monti model and the symmetric Cournot version.
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We make two remarks here. First, recalling that L1 > L2 as γL;1 < γL;2, we see that
the counterintuitive dL1=dr > 0 change applies to the bank with the largest volume
of loans. Second, dL1=dr > 0 implies that r 00L.L/[L2−L1] > 0. It can be verified by
using (6) that r 00L.L/[L2 −L1] > 0 if and only if f 02.L1/ < f 01.L2/, i.e. the derivative
of the reaction function of bank 2 is in the equilibrium smaller than the derivative of
the reaction function of bank 1. Finally, the deposit side can be discussed in a similar
way.
4. Asymmetric Conduct
Now consider the Stackelberg model of quantity leadership. Suppose that bank 1 is
the leader (i.e., it can set its quantities L1 and D1 first), and bank 2 is the follower. As
in the previous section, assume that the management-cost functions of the banks are
linear, but now also assume that they are equal. That is, the only asymmetry is now
caused by the way of conduct.
This two-stage model is solved backwards. In the second stage, bank 2 maximizes
its profits, taking as given the output .L1;D1/ of bank 1. This maximization problem
is the same as that of a Cournot bank. The first-order conditions for the follower
are given by (4) and (5), assuming γL;i D γL and γD;i D γD, i D 1; 2. In this
section, it is convenient to write the reaction function related to the loans of firm 2
as L2 D f .L1; r/, i.e. we include r explicitly as an argument and omit the subscript
‘2’ of f ./. As a matter of notation, the first-order partial derivatives of f ./ with
respect to respectively L1 and r will be abbreviated as f 0L./ and f 0r ./. In a similar
way, we write the reaction function for the deposit side of bank 2 as g.D1; r/, with
first-order partial derivatives g0D./ and g0r ./. With regard to bank 2 we make the
same assumptions as made in the previous section with respect to the Cournot banks.
In particular, we have −1 < f 0L./ < 0 and −1 < g0D./ < 0.
Next, look at the first stage of the model. Bank 1 wants to choose the amounts L1 and
D1 such that its profit is maximized, taking into account how bank 2 will respond to
its choice. The problem for bank 1 is therefore
max
.L1;D1/
1.L1;D1/ D [rL.L1 C f .L1; r// − r]L1
C[r.1 − / − rD.D1 C g.D1; r//]D1 − C.L1;D1/
where we assume that the profit function 1.:/ is strictly concave. The first-order
conditions for the leader are
@1
@L1
D r 0L.L1 C f .L1; r//[1 C f 0L./]L1
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C rL.L1 C f .L1; r// − r − γL D 0 (12)
@1
@D1
D r.1 − / − r 0D.D1 C g.D1; r//[1 C g0D./]D1
− rD.D1 C g.D1; r// − γD D 0 (13)
We assume that a unique (positive) Stackelberg equilibrium exists. It is characterized
by the four first-order conditions and denoted by eL1, eL2, eD1 and eD2. The corre-
sponding total equilibrium volumes are eL  eL1 C eL2 and eD  eD1 C eD2, and the
corresponding interest rates areerL anderD .
It follows from (4) and (12) and the assumption that the marginal management costs
of loans of the two banks are equal that
f ./ D eL2./ D [1 C f 0L./]eL1 (14)
As a result, eL1 > eL2, i.e. the volume of loans of the leader bank is largest. Similarly,
it can be shown that eD1 > eD2.
Now consider the effects of a change in the interbank interest rate r. We first observe














D [1 C f 0L./]
deL1
dr
C f 0r ./ (15)
It is easy to verify that f 0r ./ < 0. Thus, we conclude directly that if deL1=dr < 0,
then deL2=dr < 0 as well. In a similar way, if deD1=dr > 0, then deD2=dr > 0 as
well. Next, we present the following helpful lemma.
Lemma 1 In the Stackelberg version of the model, where bank 1 is the leader and








, with A2 < 0 the second-order
derivative of the (strictly concave) profit function of bank 1 with respect to L1, and
A1 D −6.f 0L.//2 − 6f 0L./ − 1 C HL./
A3 D −.f 0L.//2 C 1 > 0
where
HL./ D [1 C f
0
L./]r 000L ./.f .//2
2r 0L./ C r 00L./f ./
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All expressions are evaluated in the Stackelberg equilibrium.
PROOF. See the appendix.
Observe that the sign of HL./ is minus the sign of r 000L ./, the third-order derivative of
rL./. Similarly, for the deposit side there holds:
Lemma 2 In the Stackelberg version of the model, where bank 1 is the leader and








, with B2 < 0 the second-order
derivative of the (strictly concave) profit function of bank 1 with respect to D1, and
B1 D .1 − /[−6.g0D.//2 − 6g0D./ − 1 C HD./]
B3 D .1 − /[−.g0D.//2 C 1] > 0
where
HD./ D [1 C g
0
D./]r 000D ./.g.//2
2r 0D./ C r 00D./g./
All expressions are evaluated in the Stackelberg equilibrium.
Observe that the sign of HD./ is the same as the sign of r 000D./. Using (7), (8), and
Lemma’s 1 and 2, we easily obtain the following proposition on the effects of a
change in the interbank market rate r.
Proposition 4.1 In the Stackelberg version of the model, where bank 1 is the
leader and bank 2 is the follower, the following holds:
(a) deL
dr
< 0 and derL
dr
> 0.
(b) Let r 000L .eL1 C eL2/ D 0. Then deL1dr < 0 if and only if c1 < f 0L.eL1; r/ < c2.
(c) Let r 000L .eL1 C eL2/ < 0. Then f 0L.eL1; r/ 2 .c1; c2/ implies deL1dr < 0.






> 0 and derD
dr
> 0.
(f) Let r 000D.eD1 C eD2/ D 0. Then deD1dr > 0 if and only if c1 < g0D.eD1; r/ < c2.
(g) Let r 000D.eD1 C eD2/ > 0. Then g0D.eD1; r/ 2 .c1; c2/ implies deD1dr > 0.




where c1 D − 12 − 16
p




Part (a) of Proposition 4.1 shows that the comparative static effect on the total vol-
ume of loans eL has the ‘normal’ negative sign. However, parts (b) and (d) point out
that there are situations where the effect on the volume of loans of the leader bank
1 is positive, i.e. deL1=dr > 0. We notice that the critical values c1 and c2 are lo-
cated symmetrically around − 12 . Recall that if the inverse loan demand is linear, we
have f 0L.eL1; r/ D − 12 . Thus, in the situations of parts (b) and (d) with deL1=dr > 0,
the value of f 0L.eL1; r/ is sufficiently different from its value in the linear case. In-
tuitively speaking, we can say that counterintuitive effects can occur if we are suffi-
ciently far away from the linear case. We further remark that deL1=dr > 0 implies
that deL2=dr < 0, because deL=dr < 0. Recalling that eL1 > eL2, we see that, just as
in the asymmetric Cournot case, the counterintuitive effect applies to the bank with
the largest volume of loans. Finally, we remark again that the results of the deposit
side can be discussed in a similar way.
5. Conclusions
In the original, monopolistic Klein-Monti bank model and the corresponding Cournot
generalization with symmetric management costs, a change in the exogenous inter-
bank market interest rate leads to the intuitive result of a decrease in a bank’s volume
of loans, an increase in its volume of deposits, and increases in the interest rates on
loans and deposits. This paper demonstrates that for the Cournot version with asym-
metric costs as well as for the Stackelberg version of the model, the same results hold
for the total volumes of loans and deposits, and the corresponding interest rates.
However, in the asymmetric-cost Cournot version the changes in the individual vol-
umes of loans and deposits of the bank with the smallest costs may change direc-
tion. The same holds for the individual volumes of the leader in the Stackelberg ver-
sion. That is, we have shown that for oligopolistic generalizations of the Klein-Monti
model, when there are asymmetries, either in the cost functions of the banks or in the
way of conduct, a change in the interbank rate may lead to counterintuitive results
for the individual loan and deposit volumes of the banks, even in the case of only two
banks. In both cases, the bank for which the counterintuitive effect occurs is the one
with the largest volume of loans (or deposits).
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Appendix: Proof of Lemma 1
In this appendix we briefly discuss the proof of Lemma 1. In order to provide the
proof, the following equations are useful:
f 0L./ D −
r 0L./ C r 00L./f ./
2r 0L./ C r 00L./f ./
(A.1)
1 C f 0L./ D
r 0L./
2r 0L./ C r 00L./f ./
(A.2)
f 0r ./ D
1






L ./f ./ C 2r 00L./][1 C f 0L./]f 0r ./ − r 00L./f 0L./f 0r ./






L ./f ./ C r 00L./][1 C f 0L./]2 − 2r 00L./f 0L./[1 C f 0L./]
2r 0L./ C r 00L./f ./
(A.5)
where the derivatives of f ./ have been computed by differentiating the first-order
condition (4) of the follower.
Let us first concentrate on the leader. Differentiating the first-order condition (12)
with respect to r, and solving for dL1=dr gives the result that in the Stackelberg
equilibrium we have deL1=dr D A1=A2; where








Here, all derivatives of rL./ are evaluated in the point .eL1 Cf .eL1; r//, and f ./ and
its derivatives are evaluated in .eL1; r/. Using (A.1), (A.2), (A.3), and (A.4), it can be
verified that (A.6) can be rewritten as
A1 D −f 0L./ −
r 0L./r 00L./[1 C f 0L./]eL1
[2r 0L./ C r 00L./f ./]2
−2.r
00
L.//2f ./[1 C f 0L./]eL1
[2r 0L./ C r 00L./f ./]2
C HL./ (A.8)
where
HL./  [1 C f
0
L./]r 000L ./.f .//2
2r 0L./ C r 00L./f ./
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Recalling (14), we substitute f ./ D [1Cf 0L./]eL1 into (A.8). Rewriting the resulting
expression using (A.1) and (A.2) shows that A1 can be written as
A1 D −6.f 0L.//2 − 6f 0L./ − 1 C HL./ (A.9)
which proves the part concerning A1 of Lemma 1.
Next, in order to demonstrate the part concerning A3, we observe that it follows from
(15) that deL=dr D A3=A2; where
A3 D .1 C f 0L.//A1 C f 0r ./A2 (A.10)
By making use of (A.5) and applying the same methods as above, f 0r ./A2 can be
shown to satisfy
f 0r ./A2 D 6.f 0L.//3 C 11.f 0L.//2 C 7f 0L./ C 2 − [1 C f 0L./]HL./ (A.11)
Substituting (A.9) and (A.11) into (A.10) gives
A3 D −.f 0L.//2 C 1 (A.12)
which completes the proof.
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